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The civil rule, however, results in the presumption that the infant is
not capable of exercising the same discretion as an adult or acting as
a reasonably prudent man until he reaches majority.
It is the opinion of the writer that the criminal rule is too harsh
in applying an adult standard after the infant reaches the age of
fourteen. The infant may be able to distinguish good from evil at
an earlier age than he is able to distinguish the wise from the unwise,
but, it remains, an infant of fourteen is immature as to knowledge
of legal right and wrong as well as to discretion. Especially in
crimes involving negligence, this rule works a hardship upon the
infant for in these instances he has no intention of accomplishing
the wrongful act but does so by his failure to exercise the proper
discretion.
Not all infants of the same age are capable of exercising the same
degree of care or able to distinguish right from wrong in an equal
degree. Arbitrary age limits are artificial and do not serve the purpose of justice. In civil cases it is recognized that chronological age
is a poor standard in determining an infant's capacity to be negligent and that it is far more just to consider the infant's general
characteristics, only one of which is age. If age limits are not conclusive in determining an infant's capacity to be negligent in cases
where only his tort liability is involved, a fortiori they should not be
used in criminal cases where their use results in the unjust protection
of the intelligent infant under seven years of age and the unjust
punishment of the dull infant over fourteen. It would be better to
leave the question of the infant's accountability to the jury to decide
in the light of what might fairly and reasonably be expected of an
infant of the defendant's age, intelligence, experience, and general
capacity. This would make the tort and the criminal rule the same.
MARY LOUISE BARTON

NEGLIGENCE: THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
Not infrequently in the study of law, one finds situations in the
field of negligence in which a different standard of care is employed

to determine liability in civil and in criminal cases.

It is the pur-

pose of this note to compare the standards of care required of physicians and surgeons in the two fields. Do the courts, in the prosecution of a physician or surgeon or one assuming to act as such, judge
the prisoner by the same objective standard that is used to deter-

mine his civil liability, or is a different standard used?
Tort liability of a physician is measured by the following
standard: A physician or surgeon is required to exercise the degree
of care ordinarily exercised by average members of the profession

STUDENT NOTEs
m good standing practicing in the same or similar locality. This
standard is wholly objective, giving no attention to the physician's
state of mind, but requiring him to be as careful as his fellow physician would be under similar circumstances.
The cases, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, in
which a physician was prosecuted for manslaughter resulting from
gross negligence, reveal a striking departure from this objective
standard? Thus in the case of Rice v. State,' in which the defendant
gave harsh steam baths and administered lobelia which caused the
death of the patient, it was held error to refuse the following instruction:
"If the jury believe from the evidence that Rice in his treatment of Mrs. Keithley acted with good and honest intention, they
will find him not guilty."
And in the case of State v. Schultz,' the court held a proper
instruction to be:
"To constitute manslaughter, the killing must have been the
consequence of some unlawful act and if the prisoner acted with
honest intentions and expectations of curing the deceased by his
treatment, although death, unexpected by him was the consequence, he was not guilty of manslaughter and you must acquit
him."
Commonwealth v. Thompson,' an early Massachusetts case,
although it tends toward objectivity, is similar to the previous cases
in result. It holds that the defendant must be acquitted if he had
honest intentions and expected recovery; but if the defendant had
such knowledge or probable information of the fatal tendency of his
prescription that it could be reasonably presumed by the jury that
his act was the result of obstinate, willful rashness and not of honest
intentions, he could be convicted of manslaughter.
In the light of these early cases it seems clearly apparent that
the objective standard of the civil law was not used in determining
criminal liability. In fact there seems to be no standard at all other
than the subjective elements of good intentions and honest expectations. Bishop in his work on criminal law gives a rataionalization of
this subjective approach. He says that because it is commendable
for one to attempt to cure another, this is a more humane doctrine.
I Dunman v. Raney, 118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915); Whitsell
v. Hill, 101 Iowa 630, 70 N. W. 750 (1889); Wilks v. Black, 188 Mich.
478, 154 N. W. 561 (1915); Hales v. Ranes, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130
S. W. 425 (1910); note (1930) 78 Pa. Law Rev. 92, 94; note (1929)
29 Col. Law Rev. 985, 986; note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 223.
'Honnard v. People, 77 Ill. 481 (1875); State v. Schultz, 55 Iowa
628, 8 N. W. 469 (1881); Com. v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134 (1809); Rice
v. State, 8 Mo. 561 (1844).
'8 Mo. 561 (1844).
4 55 Iowa 628, 8 N. W. 469 (1881).
'6 Mass. 134 (1809).
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No one in fact knows much of the science of medicine; therefore, no
one ought be heard to say that some one else was ignorant or negligent in something about which he knows little.!
From a very subjective viewpoint in the early cases, the courts
have swung to an almost totally objective viewpoint. No longer do
the good intentions and honest expectations of the physician serve as
an adequate defense in a prosecution for homicide resulting from
gross negligence."
In the case of Hampton v. State,' the court holds that where the
death of a person results from the criminal negligence of a physician,
the latter is guilty of manslaughter and this notwithstanding that the
physician administered with good intentions and did so with full
expectations of recovery.
The court instructed in Commonwealth v. Pierce,' that it was not
necessary to show an evil intent. If the defendant caused the death
by gross negligence he was guilty of manslaughter in the opinion of
the court without regard to his intentions and expectations.
As is illustrated by the above cases, the criminal liability of a
physician in modern times for unintentional death is predicated
fundamentally upon criminal negligence. It becomes necessary
therefore to determine what constitutes criminal negligence of a physician and by what standard it is measured?
Cases have held that criminal negligence exists where the physician or surgeon exhibits gross lack of competency, or gross inattention or criminal indifference to the patient's safety."
This may arise
from the physician's gross ignorance of the science of medicine or
surgery and through his gross negligence in the use of his instruments and in the selection of his remedies. =
In the cases which hold a physician criminally liable for gross
negligence, the writer has found no mention of the standard by
which this gross negligence is measured. In determining a physician's criminal liability do the courts use the standard of the average physician in good standing practicing in the same or similar
locality or do they revert to the standard of the reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances which is used to determine civil liability
in ordinary negligence cases?
6 As paraphrased from quotation in State v. Schultz, 55 Iowa 628,
8 N. W. 469 (1881).
State v. Giles, 8 Wash. 12, 35 P. 417 (1894); Hampton v. State,
50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905); Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 Am.
Rep. 264, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 391 (1884); State v. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644,
47 Am. Rep. 131 (1883); Wharton on Homicide, (3d ed. 1907) 713.
850 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905).
"138 Mass. 165, 52 A. M. Rep. 264, 265 (1884).
"°State v. Hardister, 38 Ark. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 5 (1882); Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905); State v. Lester, 127 Minn.
282, 149 N. W. 297 (1914).
"'Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905).
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In the case of physicians and surgeons, the courts have gone one
step further than in ordinary negligence cases and have made the
standard not that of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances, but that of an average physician in good standing in the same
or similar locality."
There were sound reasons which prompted the courts to make
this exception to the general rule.
First, the reasonably prudent man standard does not adequately
emphasize the professional capacity of the physician.
Secondly, it was decided that not only must physicians and
surgeons be limited as a class for the purpose of setting a standard,
but that the standard must be set by the conduct of the average members of the class in good standing for in no other manner could the
standard be made sufficiently high.
Thirdly, it is recognized that cities offer a more profitable practice and more convenience than does the country. Because of this
the best men in the profession are usually drawn to the city. To
require the country doctor to measure up to a standard set by the city
doctor would result in the imposition of a hardship on the country
doctor. For this reason the locality in which the physician practices
has a material bearing upon the standard of care which is required
of him 3
If the professional capacity of the physician deserves emphasis
in a civil action, why should it not deserve the same emphasis in a
criminal prosecution? If it would be unfair to hold the city and the
country doctor to the same standard in a civil action, why would it
not be just as unfair to do so in a criminal prosecution?
It is submitted that there is no sound reason why one standard
should be used to determine civil liability and another standard be
used in determining criminal liability. It is also submitted that when
the courts refer to gross negligence in a criminal prosecution, they
refer to negligence as measured by the standard of an average physician in good standing practicing in the same or similar locality, and
not negligence as measured by the standard of the reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances.
Justice Holmes lends his support to this view by way of dictum
in the case of Commonwealth v. Pierce,in which he seemingly implies
that the standard is the same in both civil and criminal cases. He
says:
"If a physician is not less liable for reckless conduct than
other people, it is clear in the light of admitted principle and in
the later Massachusetts cases, that the recklessness of the crimimust be tested by what we
nal no less than that of the civil law
1
have called the external standard." '
Supra note 1, see cases cited.
Note (1941) 29 Ky. L. J.
14
Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 177, 178 (1884).
2
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A number of courts have held that criminal negligence is largely
a matter of degree left for the determination of the jury, such degree
necessarily being higher than that required for ordinary negligence.
If criminal negligence is only a higher degree of negligence, civil and
criminal negligence being the same in kind and differing only in
degree, some basis is established for saying that the standard for
determining each should be the same.
By way of summary it can be said that the early criminal cases
did not invoke the well established civil standard of care but used
a subjective one: The later criminal cases have swung to an objective view and it is believed that the standard used in determining
criminal -negligence of 'a physician should be and is the same as that
used to determine his ordinary negligence.
Thus a physician can be civilly liable, criminally liable, or both
civilly and criminally liable for his negligent acts. The distinction
is not in the standard of care by which negligence is measured in the
two bases, but in the degree of carelessness which the act exhibits.
Td impose criminal liability, the degree of negligence must be greater
than that required to impose civil liability, but the standard of care
for determining when negligence occurs is the same in either case.
Roy VANCE, JR.

